Epistemic Structural Realism and Poincare's Philosophy of Science by Brading, Katherine & Crull, Elise
Epistemic Structural Realism
and Poincare´’s Philosophy of Science
Katherine Brading∗ and Elise M. Crull†
Dec 2009; revised Aug 2010
Abstract
Recent discussions of structuralist approaches to scientific theories have stemmed
primarily from Worrall’s (1989), in which he defends a position (since characterized
‘epistemic structural realism’) whose historical roots he attributes to Poincare´. In the
renewed debate inspired by Worrall, it is thus not uncommon to find Poincare´’s name
associated with various structuralist positions. However, Poincare´’s structuralism is
deeply entwined with both his conventionalism and his idealism, and in this paper we
explore the nature of these dependencies. What comes out in the end is not only a
clearer picture of Poincare´’s position regarding structuralism, but also two arguments
for versions of epistemic structuralism different in kind from that given by Worrall.
1 Introduction
In what has become the seminal realism paper in the literature—Worrall’s (1989)—Worrall
offers a middle ground for those who feel the realist pull of the “no-miracles” intuition whilst
recognizing the anti-realist thrust of the argument based on the pessimistic meta-induction.
Following Ladyman’s (1998) distinction between ontic and epistemic approaches, Worrall’s
position has been further clarified and dubbed epistemic structural realism (hereafter ESR).
In his work, Worrall appeals to Poincare´ as a historical source for his position. The primary
goal of the present paper is to clarify the extent to which (or, better: the senses in which)
Poincare´’s structuralism is appropriately labeled “epistemic” and “realist”. Specifically, we
explore the relationship between Poincare´’s structuralism and his idealism and convention-
alism. In the process, we come across two additional arguments for structuralism, different
in kind from that offered by Worrall.
We begin, in section 2, with a brief review of Worrall’s position and his appeal to
Poincare´. This includes the first argument for structuralism—that offered by Worrall.
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Section 3 offers some preliminary remarks on Poincare´’s epistemology, structuralism and
realism. These remarks provide a framework for our more detailed discussion, and are
sufficient to lead us to the second argument for structuralism (see section 4). Our detailed
discussion of Poincare´’s discussion begins in section 5, with consideration of the role of
Kantian idealism. This leads to the third argument for structuralism (given in section 6).
Next, we consider the relevance of Poincare´’s famous conventionalism for his characteriza-
tion as an epistemic structural realist (section 7). We end with a discussion of the three
arguments thus elaborated (section 8) and some concluding remarks (section 9). The up-
shot is, we hope, a clearer understanding of Poincare´’s position with respect to the current
structural realism debate. Specifically, we can see the similarities and differences between
Poincare´’s position and contemporary ESR in terms of the character of each, along with
the arguments on which each is founded.
2 Poincare´ and Worrall’s ESR
The central thesis of Worrall’s ESR is that we have good reason to believe that the entities
in the world exemplify the structures posited by our best scientific theories, but we should
be epistemically non-committal about the non-structural natures of the entities in question.
Worrall writes (1989, p. 122, emphasis original): “[The structural realist] insists that it is
a mistake to think that we can ever ‘understand’ the nature of the basic furniture of the
universe.” The position is thus presented as a retreat from full-blown scientific realism that
reflects the epistemic modesty appropriate in light of the argument from the pessimistic
meta-induction. Because the position was developed in this manner, it follows that it is
highly contingent upon the actual history of science. In his 2007 paper Worrall says:
No one should claim a stronger sense of continuity, and hence a stronger version
of realism, than is compatible with the historical record. We should look for
the strongest such version and see if it is a continuity worth having. If there
is no such notion of continuity worth having, then there is no sustainable ver-
sion of realism. However, I hold that there is a continuity (admittedly of an
approximate kind) at the structural level that is substantial enough to count
and hence I hold that [structural scientific realism] is a sustainable version of
scientific realism, and indeed... the only sustainable version. (2007, p. 144)
Poincare´ enters the picture as being, in Worrall’s view, the first figure to both present
a version of the pessimistic meta-induction and to advocate a position similar to his own
ESR. Worrall writes:
There was continuity or accumulation in the shift [from Fresnel’s theory of light
to Maxwell’s], but the continuity is one of form or structure, not of content. In
fact this claim was already made and defended by Poincare´. And Poincare´ used
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the example of the switch from Fresnel to Maxwell to argue for a general sort
of syntactic or structural realism ... This largely forgotten thesis of Poincare´’s
seems to me to offer the only hopeful way of both underwriting the ‘no miracles’
argument and accepting an accurate account of the extent of theory change in
science. (Worrall 1989, p. 117; emphasis original)
This characterization of Poincare´ as a historical precursor for contemporary ESR can
be found elsewhere in the literature. For example, Zahar (2001, p. 37) agrees with Worrall
in characterizing Poincare´ as an epistemic structural realist:
Poincare´’s structural realism is in a sense a reversal of Quine’s slogan: to be
is to be quantified over (in some first-order theory); for according to Poincare´,
only the universals, and more particularly the relations occurring in a unified
and empirically successful theory, mirror the ontological order of things. As for
the nature of the relata, it will forever remain hidden from us.
Like Worrall, Gower (2000) designates Poincare´ as one of the earliest adherents to
structural realism, where Gower understands the term as follows (pp. 73-74):
In the case of ‘structural’ scientific realism, the central idea is that scientific
theories do indeed provide information unavailable to us in observation and
experimentation, but that information is about the form or structure, rather
than the nature or content, of what is unobservable. Often, it is claimed, when
one theory is replaced by another, it is information about the essential nature
of what is unobservable that is replaced, rather than information about the
structure of the unobservable.
In the very same paragraph quoted above, Gower goes on to state that “the idea of
structural realism, broadly construed” had been adopted by Poincare´, Duhem, Cassirer,
Schlick, Carnap, and Russell. Gower proceeds to give an account of how several of these
historical figures, among others, can be considered as latching onto particular tenets of
structural realism. He begins the section on Poincare´ by claiming “The view we know as
structural scientific realism was explicitly and clearly expressed by Poincare´” (Ibid., p. 80),
a statement that is footnoted with references to the discussion of Poicnare´’s position in
Worrall’s 1989 and 1994, to Psillos 1995, and to Zahar 1996.
After a brief sketch of Poincare´’s view (supplemented with the usual quotes from
Poincare´’s major works), Gower concedes that though from a modern perspective one might
easily find something like the no miracles argument and the pessimistic meta-induction in
Poincare´, one must ask whether this modern characterization misrepresents his position;
Gower notes in particular (cf. p. 101) the mind-dependent aspect of Poincare´’s view (of
which more below). In the end, though, Gower decides that the usual ‘rough’ characteriza-
tion of Poincare´ is generally correct, writing (Ibid., p. 86): “For both Poincare´ and Duhem,
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then, a defensible scientific realism must be structural in the sense that it attributes reality
to the relational structure of a scientific theory.”
We think that there is widespread recognition that attributing ESR to Poincare´ is a lit-
tle “rough and ready”. Our goal in this paper is to set out the epistemic, structuralist and
realist character of Poincare´’s position. Domski (2000) explicitly argues that Poincare´’s
position should not be interpreted as straightforwardly realist. We agree with her assess-
ment, and will here explore Poincare´’s structuralism with respect to the conventionalist and
idealist aspects of his philosophy of science. Indeed, we shall argue that all three terms in
the ESR classification of Poincare´’s position (“epistemic”, ’“structuralist”, and “realist”)
should be handled with care: each means something rather different for Poincare´ than for
Worrall (and for contemporary ESR in general). Moreover, the motivation for Poincare´’s
position demands re-examination. We ask: is Worrall right that Poincare´ argues for his
structuralist position by appeal to history of science and the pessimistic meta-induction?
3 Preliminary remarks on Poincare´’s epistemology,
structuralism and realism
It will be helpful to begin by covering some commonly understood ground regarding
Poincare´’s epistemology, structuralism and realism. Below we provide a brief refresher
on where Poincare´ stands with respect to each.
There’s no doubt about the appropriateness of labeling Poincare´’s position as epistemic
in some sense, for in all of his popular works he stresses that which is knowable. More
specifically, he is concerned repeatedly with that which is knowable by us—with the partic-
ular faculties we have qua human beings. However, his focus on what we can know needs
to be understood in the wider context of his epistemology, and this will be central theme
of our paper. We return to it in section 5 below.
Turning now to Poincare´’s structuralism, there are two aspects we want to highlight at
the outset. First, Poincare´ is clear that when doing science, our commitment is to relations
rather than to the things in themselves. There is a famous statement to this effect in the
preface of Science and Hypothesis (1902, p. xxiv; hereafter SH): “The aim of science is
not things in themselves, as the dogmatists in their simplicity imagine, but the relations
between things; outside those relations there is no reality knowable.” Thus, there is an
epistemic relationist aspect to Poincare´’s structuralism.
Second, Poincare´’s view of theory construction contains a distinct structuralist strain.
He describes the role of mathematical physics within physics to be a structural one: in
constructing a scientific theory we use mathematics to structure empirically-derived sci-
entific facts. Writing about this in SH (p. 141) he says: “Science is built up of facts, as
a house is built of stones; but an accumulation of facts is no more a science than a heap
of stones is a house.” Employing a different analogy, Poincare´ compares the function of
mathematical physics to that of a library catalogue, where the experimental facts serve as
4
the “books” (Ibid., pp. 144-145). It is the duty of the mathematical physicist to take new
data generated by experiment and order them usefully (where “usefully” means that this
cataloguing process directs us toward the sorts of experiments necessary for supplementing
the library with interesting new books). In short, facts must be given structure—this is
what it is to do science, and to construct scientific theories.
Both these aspects of Poincare´’s structuralism—his “epistemic relationism” and his
“theories as structures”—will be important in what follows.
Lastly, consider Poincare´’s realism. It is worth noting immediately that Poincare´ dis-
tinguishes between “brute facts”, or facts-in-the-world, and the facts that serve as the
subject-matter of knowledge (and more specifically, of science). He explains in The Value
of Science (1905, hereafter VS) that “The scientific fact is only the crude fact translated
into a convenient language” (p. 120, emphasis original), and later, “[A]ll the scientist
creates in a fact is the language in which he enunciates it” (Ibid., p. 121; emphasis orig-
inal). Note that “scientific facts” according to Poincare´ involve an ineliminable human
contribution.
That said, Poincare´’s popular writings are full of phrases such as “objective reality”,
“true relations”, “real relations”, and so on. Much of this talk sounds realist, at least about
relations. In the very chapter of SH appealed to by Worrall for his arguments, Poincare´
writes (p. 161): “The true relations between these real objects are the only reality we
can attain.” However, such statements concerning truth, reality and objectivity should not
be given a straightforward realist interpretation, as Domski (2000) points out. To wit,
consider the following excerpt from VS (p. 12):
If truth be the sole aim worth pursuing, may we hope to attain it? It may well
be doubted. Readers of my little book ‘Science and Hypothesis’ already know
what I think about the question. The truth we are permitted to glimpse is not
altogether what most men call by that name.
What does Poincare´ mean by “truth”, then? Poincare´ is explicit about how he should
be understood. A few pages after the above quote from VS, he continues to say:
Does the harmony the human intelligence thinks it discovers in nature exist
outside of this intelligence? No, beyond all doubt, a reality completely inde-
pendent of the mind which conceives it, sees or feels it, is an impossibility. A
world as exterior as that, even if it existed, would for us be forever inaccessi-
ble. But what we call objective reality is, in the last analysis, what is common
to many thinking beings, and could be common to all; this common part, we
shall see, can only be the harmony expressed by mathematical laws. It is this
harmony then which is the sole objective reality, the only truth we can attain...
(p. 14)
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As this quotation makes clear, knowledge of a mind-independent reality is, for Poincare´,
impossible. Moreover, objectivity means inter-subjective agreement (between human be-
ings, or beings with faculties “sufficiently similar” to our own), and truth is located within
this same inter-subjective agreement. Scientific truth and objectivity are what is inter-
subjectively stable for creatures sufficiently like us; and since (as we have seen) mathe-
matical laws express relations between scientific facts, “objective reality” refers to inter-
subjective agreement concerning these relations.
Similar remarks to those quoted above occur often in the body of Poincare´’s works, and
this is sufficient to warrant the conclusion that there is a strong idealist strain within his
thought. Clearly, this has a bearing on both his epistemology and his realism. We pursue
these issues further in our discussion below.
4 Objectivity and structuralism
In the preceding section we noted that for Poincare´, the idea of objectivity concerns inter-
subjective agreement. Related to this is Poincare´’s account of objective knowledge more
generally. In their book on objectivity, Daston and Galison (2007) claim that the grounds
for Poincare´’s structuralism lie in his account of objectivity. They distinguish this from the
motivation of current structural realists, for which they cite the challenges posed to realism
by underdetermination of theory by data and the pessimistic meta-induction. They write
(p. 261):
Yet the preoccupations of the late twentieth-century structural realists were not
those of the early twentieth-century structural objectivists: the former, like all
realists, were primarily interesting in the justification for the claim that science
was true, that it correctly described the real features of the world; the latter
(including Poincare´) were chiefly concerned with the justification for the claim
that science was objective, that it was “common to all thinking beings.”
The reference here is to VS, and has been quoted in full above. According to Daston
and Galison, the challenge to which Poincare´ and others were responding arose from devel-
opments in mid nineteenth century physiology, psychology and ethnology that cast doubt
on shared experience as the ground objectivity. The response was (p. 259) “not to reject
scientific objectivity but to deepen it”. We can see Poincare´ responding to exactly this
challenge in Chapter VI of VS, entitled “Objectivity of Science”. First, he argues for the
claim that (p. 345) “what is objective must be common to many minds and consequently
transmissible from one to the other”. Then, Poincare´ argues that (p. 345):
Sensations are therefore intransmissible, or rather all that is pure quality in
them is intransmissible and forever impenetrable. But it is not the same with
relations between these sensations. From this point of view, all that is objective
is devoid of all quality and is only pure relation...
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He argues for this by considering the case of color perception, and claiming that we
have no means of verifying whether “the sensation I call red is the same as that which
my neighbour calls red.” This is an expression of the challenge to objectivity discussed by
Daston and Galison. Poincare´ concludes thus:
... we must nevertheless admit that nothing is objective which is not trans-
missible, and consequently that the relations between the sensations can alone
have an objective value.
The argument for structuralism that Poincare´ gives here can be put into premise/conclusion
form as follows, with “communicable” substituted for “transmissible”:
Argument 1: The argument from objectivity
• Objective knowledge is necessarily common to all (i.e., inter-subjectively stable).
• That which is common to all is necessarily communicable.
• That which is communicable is knowledge of relations only.
• Therefore,
Objective knowledge just is knowledge of relations.
This is a very strong conclusion: all objective knowledge (not just scientific knowledge)
is necessarily knowledge of relations. It rests on Poincare´’s account of the relationship
between objectivity and communicability (expressed in premises 1 and 2), and on the
empirical discoveries stressed by Daston and Galison (on which premise 3 rests). Insofar as
the restriction of knowledge to knowledge of relations is a form of epistemic structuralism,
this argument supports such a version of epistemic realism.
We saw above that, according to Poincare´, scientific facts are placed into structures to
create scientific theories—in other words, scientific theories “order the facts”. This was one
aspect of Poincare´’s structuralism. Now we see that on Poincare´’s view, our knowledge of
the scientific facts is knowledge of relations; this is the second aspect of his structuralism
alluded to above. Both aspects of his structuralism (that theories are structures and that
facts are relational) are united by the view that all objective knowledge is necessarily
knowledge of relations.
At this point we already see that Poincare´’s structuralism is deeper and more thorough-
going than that of the typical contemporary epistemic structural realist. Notice, though,
that one could adopt Poicnare´’s structuralist approach to scientific theories without also
committing to his view that objective knowledge (including knowledge of scientific facts)
just is knowledge of relations. We shall return to this point in section 8.2.
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5 Poincare´’s Kantian idealism
We saw above in section 3 that there is a strong strain of idealism in Poincare´’s philosophy
of science. In this section we briefly review his philosophy of mathematics, and use this
to say something more about how to understand the idealism in Poincare´’s philosophy of
mechanics and mathematical physics.
5.1 Mathematics and the roles of a priori intuition
Let us begin with arithmetic. Like Kant, Poincare´ grounded arithmetic in synthetic a priori
intuition. In SH (Part I, Ch. I), Poincare´ argues that “indefinite repetition of the same
act”, and thus reasoning “by recurrence”, is essential to arithmetical reasoning, allowing us
to pass from particular results to general theorems. He argues that this rule of reasoning
by recurrence is obtained neither from experience nor from logic (it does not follow from
the principle of non-contradiction), but is an a priori synthetic intuition. He writes (SH,
pp. 12-13): “This rule, inaccessible to analytical proof and to experiment, is the exact type
of the a priori synthetic intuition.” He goes on (p. 13): “The mind has a direct intuition
of this power, and experiment can only be for it an opportunity of using it, and thereby of
becoming conscious of it.” In other words, through using the rule, we become aware that
we have this intuition.
Poincare´ also grounded geometry in a priori synthetic intuition, but here he made an
important departure from Kant. In SH Poincare´ constructs the mathematical continuum
in two steps, each of which makes use of the arithmetical synthetic a priori intuition of
“indefinite repetition of the same act” mentioned above. However, in Chapter III of Last
Essays (1913, hereafter LE), Poincare´ is explicit that we have an intuition of the spatial
continuum that has the same status as our arithmetical intuition. He writes (LE, p. 44):
I shall conclude that there is in all of us an intuitive notion of the continuum
of any number of dimensions whatever because we possess the capacity to con-
struct a physical and mathematical continuum; and that this capacity exists
in us before any experience because, without it, experience properly speaking
would be impossible and would be reduced to brute sensations, unsuitable for
any organization; and because this intuition is merely the awareness that we
possess this faculty. And yet this faculty could be used in different ways; it
could enable us to construct a space of four just as well as a space of three
dimensions. It is the exterior world, it is experience which induces us to make
use of it in one sense rather than in the other.
Poincare´ maintains that metrical and projective properties are not part of the intuition
that grounds our ability to construct space. Rather than a geometrical intuition (alongside
the arithmetical), we have a more general spatial intuition. Thus, Poincare´ differs from
Kant in maintaining that the dimensionality of space is not synthetic a priori. Folina
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(1992) argues, successfully in our opinion, that this is because, according to Poincare´, “it
is possible to construct viable empirical theories based upon the hypothesis that space
is, for example, four-dimensional” (Folina 1992, p. 36), where “viable” means “viable for
us”. This connects directly with Poincare´’s famous conventionalism concerning the axioms
of physical geometry: when Poincare´ says that “one geometry cannot be more true than
another; it can only be more convenient” (SH, p. 50), this is because one need not use
Euclidean geometry in order to describe the empirical world as we experience it.
In both mathematics and science, Poincare´ was focused on what we can know—i.e.,
what is knowable by us, as finite beings, with our intuitive faculties. Folina argues that in
the case of arithmetic, the significance of the synthetic a priori status is that we cannot
build a “non-standard” arithmetic—or indeed any formal system—without these principles.
Similary, she says, in the case of geometry, or rather spatial continuity, the significance is
that any account of the world as we experience it will necessarily presuppose the conti-
nuity of space. She urges that the relationship of mathematics to experience is crucial to
understanding Poincare´’s philosophy of mathematics (Folina, p. 114):
Mathematics, like any science, must seek after truth. And truth means more
than mere consistency. In mathematics it means (on the Poincare´ view) that
the axioms cohere with our intuitions, that is, with the form of experience.
This concludes our brief recapitulation of the role of intuition in Poincare´’s philosophy
of mathematics. We turn our attention now to empirical science.
5.2 Empirical science and the roles of a priori intuition
It is worth recalling before we begin that here, too, “truth” for Poincare´ means inter-
subjective agreement concerning the world as we experience it. Both arithmetical and
spatial intuition are indispensable for empirical science, and it is worthwhile exploring the
roles that they play.
In the above quotation from LE (p. 44), Poincare´ states that the very possibility of our
experience of the world as containing empirical objects depends upon spatial intuition when
he writes, “this capacity exists in us before any experience because, without it, experience
properly speaking would be impossible and would be reduced to brute sensations, unsuit-
able for any organization.” In other words, spatial intuition is that through which our
sensations are constituted into our experiences of physical objects; objects which endure
through space and time.
Moreover, the role of a priori intuition in empirical science extends beyond this, or so
we shall argue. This is because a science of empirical objects goes beyond mere experience
of objects: we must form generalizations over these objects, and our ability to form these
generalizations is itself grounded in a priori intuition. In SH (Part I, Ch. II), Poincare´
asserts that the business of science concerns generalizations—to move from premises to
conclusions that are “in a sense more general than the premisses” (p. 4). His position may
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be summed up by his own slogan: “There is no science but the science of the general”
(Ibid., p. 4). Granting this, we can ask first about the nature of this generalization, and
then about what grounds our ability to form such generalizations.
Poincare´ distinguishes between mathematics and the physical sciences in the follow-
ing relevant respect. He highlights the similarity between (i) reasoning by recurrence in
arithmetic and (ii) induction in physical science, and then points out that induction in the
physical sciences is uncertain, whereas reasoning by recurrence is not (see SH, p. 13). The
reason he gives is that induction depends for its success on “an order which is external to
us” whereas proof by recurrence depends for its success on “a property of the mind itself”.
Poincare´’s own writings leave us at this point of distinguishing between the nature of the
generalizations found in mathematics and the physical sciences. But with this difference
noted, we might still want to ask what grounds our ability to perform inductive reasoning
in the physical sciences. We have seen that in mathematics our ability to generalize is
grounded in arithmetical intuition. What about the physical sciences? In answering this,
it seems to us that a plausible case can be made for three further roles for a priori intuition
within Poincare´’s philosophy of science.
Consider first the following quotation from Folina. She begins with the role of spatial
intuition with respect to our experience of physical objects, and then moves on to consider
generalizations:
A priori intuition—or the form of experience—is that via which we understand,
by our sensory manifold, an experience of a single object enduring through
space and time, despite the inevitably incomplete character of experience. It is
also that via which we understand certain rules as characterizing infinite, yet
determinate, collections. A priori intuition can thus be regarded as a ‘glossing
over’ faculty: a faculty which glosses over the incomplete character of both
empirical and mathematical experience. It is a procedure whereby we ignore
all the elements which could be generated by a rule, and we disregard or ‘smooth
out’ the disparate character of perception. (p. 86)
Folina argues that for Poincare´ our ability to “gloss over”—and thereby to make
generalizations—lies in a priori intuition (in spatial intuition for empirical generalizations,
and in arithmetical intuition for mathematical generalizations). The point here is that in
order to form generalizations we must disregard as irrelevant certain features of the partic-
ular objects that we are placing under the generalization. In the case of physical objects it
is, according to Folina’s reading of Poincare´, our spatial intuition that allows us to do this.
The second place where a priori intuition plays a role is as follows. Disregarding certain
features as irrelevant is necessary but not sufficient for us to form a generalization: we
require also the concept of indefinite iterability (a concept that, for example, allows us to
repeatedly apply rules). As Folina writes (Ibid., p. 93):
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Poincare´ believed that the concept of indefinite iterability... is foundational,
not only for arithmetic, but for all systematic thinking; and its epistemological
source is synthetic a priori intuition. ...[I]t underlies all systematic thinking
because it underlies our ability to generalize.
In short, our ability to generalize is grounded in arithmetical a priori intuition, because
this intuition grounds our ability to perform iterations. Thus, arithmetical intuition also
plays a crucial role in our ability to generalize with respect to empirical objects.
We will come to the third role for a priori intuition shortly, but first—with the above
point in mind—we can return to where Poincare´ left us, with the distinction between
mathematical reasoning by recurrence and induction in the physical sciences. We saw that
the difference lies in the objects that are the subject-matter of the generalization. The
fallibility of induction lies in the fact that we can make mistakes when we decide which
aspects of the particular physical objects to ignore as irrelevant, and which to take into
account when forming the generalization. Nevertheless, with this decision made, what
grounds our ability to form the generalization is the same in the case of induction as it is
for mathematical reasoning by recurrence: it is arithmetical a priori intuition. This is not
something that Poincare´ says, but it is, we maintain, a plausible answer to a question that
he left unanswered. Furthermore, it is supported by the discussion that Poincare´ does offer
regarding generalization in physical science.
Generalization is involved in physical science at two distinct stages. The first is when
the empirical data are organized: we must draw our line through the dots on the page that
record our experimental results. The relevant point for our purposes is that this choice
goes beyond “mere” generalization (SH, pp. 142-143):
However timid we may be, there must be interpolation. Experiment only gives
us a certain number of isolated points. They must be connected by a continuous
line, and this is a true generalisation. But more is done. The curve thus traced
will pass between and near the points observed; it will not pass through the
points themselves. Thus we are not restricted to generalising our experiment,
we correct it... Detached facts cannot therefore satisfy us, and that is why our
science must be ordered, or better still, generalised.
Thus the interpolation—the act of drawing a curve to fit the data—is a moment in which
Poincare´ claims we not only generalize the data, but also correct it. This additional feature
of empirical generalization (beyond that found in mathematics) arises from the different
nature of objects that serve as subject-matter for the generalizations, and leads to the
fallibility of those generalizations.
The second type of generalization takes the results of this first stage (drawing curves
through data points) as input in order to generate empirical laws. Thus, the laws are
grounded from the start on generalizations. It is these laws, then, that enable us to achieve
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the desired generality that the human mind seeks (see VS, p. 14, quoted above), and which
allow us to progress in science. As Poincare´ says (SH pp. 129-130):
Who gives us the right of attributing to the principle itself more generality
and more precision than to the experiments which have served to demonstrate
it? This is asking, if it is legitimate to generalise, as we do every day, empiric
data... One thing alone is certain. If this permission were refused to us, science
could not exist; or at least would be reduced to a kind of inventory, to the
ascertaining of isolated facts. It would not [sic] longer be to us of any value,
since it could not satisfy our need of order and harmony, and because it would
be at the same time incapable of prediction.
In sum, it seems to us that a priori intuition clearly grounds our ability to construct
the generalizations that form the very substance of physical theorizing.
There is a third role for a priori intuition. It is not just our ability to construct gen-
eralizations that is grounded in a priori intuition: our ability to apply the resulting gen-
eralizations is similarly grounded. With respect to mathematics, Folina writes (1992, p.
87):
In order to understand the abstract characterization of a rule, we must under-
stand an arbitrary instance of it. ... Applying a rule requires that we see that
the application possesses the same essential structural properties, or ‘shape’, as
the arbitrary instance given in the schematic characterization of the rule. The
aspects which are structural are those which an arbitrary instance possesses. A
priori intuition supplies us with the ability to understand what these are.
If this reading of Poincare´ is correct, then the conclusion is readily extended beyond
mathematics. A physical law is a particular type of rule, and it is a generalization. In order
to apply laws (generalizations) to physical objects we must be able to recognize that the
objects instantiate the law. We might go further, and insist that to understand a physical
law is to be able to recognize an instance of that law. The point is this: insofar as our
ability to recognize physical objects as instantiating of a law depends on arithmetical and/or
spatial intuition, there is this further role for a priori intuition in Poincare´’s philosophy of
science.
As Folina emphasizes, the generalizations in play here are structural generalizations.
That this must be the case follows from her account of a priori intuition. There is, moreover,
an additional way to see that the type of generalization at work in physical science must be
structural. We have seen that laws for Poincare´ capture the relations between things; thus,
to recognize that objects offer an instance of a given law is to recognize that they stand
in the relations that are described by the law. In order to achieve this, we must ignore
the non-relational features of the objects, if any such are presented to us in experience. A
priori intuition is therefore not only that which enables us to generalize, but also that which
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enables us to apply the resulting generalizations. By the very nature of what is involved in
the construction and application of generalizations, they must concern relations: they are
what we will call structural generalizations.
In this section we have discussed the role of Kantian idealism in Poincare´’s philosophy
of science. This idealism is a central characteristic of both his epistemology and his realism.
Therefore, when classifying Poincare´ as an epistemic structural realist we must read both
the “epistemic” and “realist” terms of this classification in that light. As we shall now
argue, Poincare´’s structuralism, too, is directly informed by his idealism.
6 Generalization and structuralism
We saw in earlier sections that there are two strands of structuralism in Poincare´’s writing:
one associated with his claim that relations are all that we can know (his “epistemic
relationism”), and the other being his claim that scientific theories just are structures we
impose on the facts. We have also shown (cf. section 4) that Poincare´ argues for the former
(concerning structure qua relations between things) on the basis of his account of objective
knowledge. Our considerations of Poincare´’s Kantian idealism lead to an argument for the
latter (concerning structure qua theories), as follows.
Argument 2: The argument from generalization
• Scientific laws are our generalizations.
• We are able to generalize due to our arithmetical a priori synthetic intuition.
• In particular, arithmetical intuition enables us to form structural generalizations.
• Therefore,
Scientific laws are structural generalizations.
So far as we are aware, Poincare´ never states this argument explicitly. However, he
is explicitly committed to the first premise, as various statements in SH make plain. On
p. 110 he declares that certain laws are conventions, and as we demonstrate in the next
section, convention involves generalization. Thus, laws involve generalizations inasmuch as
those laws are considered conventions. On pp. 129-130 of SH, Poincare´ (discussing the two
fundamental “principles” or laws of thermodynamics) asks:
...who gives us the right of attributing to the principle itself more generality
and more precision than to the experiments which have served to demonstrate
it? This is asking, if it is legitimate to generalise, as we do every day, empiric
data, and I shall not be so foolhardy as to discuss this question, after so many
philosophers have vainly tried to solve it. One thing alone is certain. If this
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permission [to generalize] were refused to us, science could not exist; or at least
would be reduced to a kind of inventory, to the ascertaining of isolated facts.
Poincare´ goes on in chapter 9 to say “It is not sufficient merely to observe; we must use
our observations, and for that purpose we must generalise” (p. 140), and to define what a
good experiment is: “It is that which teaches us something more than an isolated fact. It
is that which enables us to predict, and to generalise. Without generalisation, prediction is
impossible” (p. 142). A good experiment, in other words, allows us to translate particular
instances into laws by generalizing those instances. And in this way, laws are themselves
generalizations.
Our discussion of Poincare´’s Kantian idealism shows that it is at least plausible that
Poincare´ is committed to the remaining premises (cf. section 5.2 above). Given these, the
conclusion follows readily. Thus, it turns out that Poincare´ has the resources to formulate
an argument for his claim that scientific laws are structures imposed on the facts, and
therefore for this second strand of his structuralism as well.
The upshot of these remarks on generalization, when taken together with the results of
the preceding sections, is that all three features of the characterization of Poincare´ as an
epistemic structural realist must be understood as being informed by his Kantian idealism.
This makes Poincare´’s version of ESR distinct on all three counts from that found in today’s
philosophy of science literature.
7 Poincare´’s conventionalism
Perhaps an obvious place to challenge the interpretation of Poincare´ as a scientific real-
ist is through the most famous aspect of his philosophy of science: his conventionalism.
However, the focus of most discussion on this point is conventionalism in philosophy of
geometry specifically, and it is perhaps less obvious that his conventionalism pervades his
account of mechanics and physical science as well. In this section, we argue that Poincare´’s
conventionalism extends into mechanics and physics, and that this fact (along with his
Kantian idealism) demands that we read the “realist” classification of his structuralism
with care. Let us begin, though, with a very brief review of his geometric conventionalism.
7.1 The axioms of geometry as convention
Poincare´’s conventionality with respect to geometry is widely known. Concisely, Poincare´’s
argument involves reasoning by elimination: he asks, what sort of science is geometry? Can
it be considered an a priori science, as Kant insisted? Poincare´ answers in the negative,
arguing against Kant in part by discussing the equal ‘conceivability’ of non-Euclidean
geometries, and in part by appealing to the indemonstrable axioms that define them (SH,
p. 35: “Every deductive science, and geometry in particular, must rest upon a certain
number of indemonstrable axioms.”). Poincare´ argues that the axioms of other geometries
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of constant curvature—namely that of Lobatschevsky and of Riemann—are not logically
contradictory to Euclidean geometry and therefore cannot be ruled out a priori. Thus we
are left in a state of underdetermination, which is in contradiction with the Kantian claim
for the a prioricity of Euclidean geometry.
Can geometry be considered an empirical science, then? The answer here is again neg-
ative, and Poincare´ gives two reasons: first, he asserts that geometry (unlike any empirical
science) cannot be modified or revised in light of new experiments, and second, geometry
is exact and does not rely on approximations, as empirical sciences are constrained to do.
If geometry can be considered neither an empirical nor an a priori science, all that remains
is that it be situated on some middle ground. This middle ground is convention:
The geometrical axioms are therefore neither synthetic a priori intuitions nor
experimental facts. They are conventions. Our choice among all possible con-
ventions is guided by experimental facts; but it remains free, and is only limited
by the necessity of avoiding every contraction, and thus it is that postulates
may remain rigorously true even when the experimental laws which have de-
termined their adoption are only approximate. In other words, the axioms of
geometry ...are only definitions in disguise. (SH, p. 50; emphasis original)
7.2 Convention in mechanics and physics
Already in the Author’s Preface to SH (p. xxvi)—after stating that he will argue for the
conventional nature of geometry’s axioms—Poincare´ continues to say:
In mechanics we shall be led to analogous conclusions, and we shall see that
the principles of this science, although more directly based on experience, still
share the conventional character of the geometrical postulates.
This is a clear statement that his conventionalism extends into mechanics, at least.
Poincare´ states that the principles of mechanics appear to us under two different aspects
(SH, pp. 135-136):
On the one hand, there are truths founded on experiment, and verified approx-
imately as far as almost isolated systems are concerned; on the other hand,
there are postulates applicable to the whole of the universe and regarded as
rigorously true.
It is this second aspect under which we realize that principles are nothing more than
convention.
Principles are conventions and definitions in disguise. They are, however, de-
duced from experimental laws, and these laws have, so to speak, been erected
into principles to which our mind attributes an absolute value. (SH, p. 138)
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He goes on to explain the process of elevating laws to the statues of principles as such:
How can a law become a principle [convention]? It expressed a relation between
to real terms, A and B; but it was not rigorously true, it was only approximate.
We introduce arbitrarily an intermediate term, C, more or less imaginary, and
C is by definition that which has with A exactly the relation expressed by the
law. So our law is decomposed into an absolute and rigorous principle which
expresses the relation of A to C, and an approximate experimental and revisable
law which expresses the relation of C to B. But it is clear that however far this
decomposition may be carried, laws will always remain. (SH pp. 138-139,
emphasis original)
Poincare´ supports this claim with an argument analogous to the one made for the
axioms of geometry. Principles are not a priori because we arrive at them via empirical
investigation. Yet they are not empirical claims either: though originally derived from
experiment, we elevate them to a status that no longer admits of empirical verification or
falsification. Poincare´ writes (SH, p. 136):
If these postulates possess a generality and a certainty which falsify the experi-
mental truths from which they were deduced, it is because they reduce in final
analysis to a simple convention that we have a right to make, because we are
certain beforehand that no experiment can contradict it.
Among the principles are, for example, Newton’s three laws of motion and energy conser-
vation. Yet (recall from section 4) that an important difference remains between geometry
and mechanics owing to our fallibility in treating the subject-matter of each science. Again
from SH (p. 137):
Our fundamental experiments [in geometry] are pre-eminently physiological ex-
periments which refer, not to the space which is the object that geometry must
study, but to our body—that is to say, to the instrument which we use for that
study. On the other hand, the fundamental conventions of mechanics and the
experiments which prove to us that they are convenient, certainly refer to the
same objects or to analogous objects. Conventional and general principles are
the natural and direct generalisations of experimental and particular principles.
As we saw above, the objects of mechanics are distinct from the objects of geometry,
and because they have a mind-independent component, we are subject to error when we
perform generalizations over them. That is, we could choose to ignore or include data
that will lead us to make a generalization that will later turn out to be inconvenient. So
while the axioms of geometry are unrevisable on Poincare´’s view (for there is no possibility
that we could change our mind about what constitutes the most convenient geometry),
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the axioms of mechanics are revisable on the basis of convenience with respect to future
empirical evidence.
With this difference noted, it is nevertheless the case that a conventionality analogous
to that associated with the axioms of geometry also applies to the principles of mechanics.
The question facing the scientific realist is this: how, then, can these “conventions” of
Poincare´’s—the principles of mechanics—express real relations between things?
Poincare´ himself insists (cf. the above quote from SH, pp. 138-139) that what conven-
tions express are the relations between a real thing (“A” or “B”) and an idealized thing
(“C”), so they alone cannot express relations between two real things. That relational work
is done by convention with the addition of laws. Therefore, in committing ourselves to the
structure of a scientific theory (consisting of conventions plus empirical laws) and to its
expression of relations between real things, we are on both counts inserting a conventional
element into our “structural realism”.
Might one limit this conventional element to mechanics, and insist that all laws associ-
ated with other natural sciences beyond simple mechanics remain empirical laws, not to be
elevated to the status of principles? This may indeed have been Poincare´’s view. It seems
to us, however, that it is difficult to make a robust distinction here between mechanics and
other areas of mathematical physics: for example, which is the nature of the second law of
thermodynamics? Unless a robust distinction can be made that shows how and why the
principles of mechanics are conventional, whereas the laws appearing elsewhere in mathe-
matical physics are not, the conventional element will pervade all of mathematical physics.
Either way one chooses to interpret Poincare´, his conventionalism renders his particular
brand of realism distinct from that associated with today’s ESR.
8 Three arguments for structuralism
In reconsidering Poincare´’s philosophy of science we have come across two arguments for
structural realism (see sections 4 and 6). What of Worrall’s argument, which he attributes
to Poincare´? And how do these three arguments compare?
8.1 Structuralism and the “bankruptcy of science”
Recall from section 2 that Worrall (1989) uses the pessimistic meta-induction to motivate
his ESR: in order to avoid the anti-realist thrust of the pessimistic meta-induction, Worrall
urges a retreat from standard scientific realism to structural realism, whereby we commit
ourselves to only the structural part of our theory and remain agnostic as to the natures
of the entities in the world instantiating those structures. Worrall (Ibid., p. 149) points to
the Preface and Chapter 10 of SH to argue that Poincare´ both confronts the pessimistic
meta-induction (or the “bankruptcy of science” in Poincare´’s own terminology) and rejects
it via his structuralism concerning scientific theories.
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The “bankruptcy of science” thesis is stated by Poincare´ as follows (SH, p. 160; em-
phasis original):
The ephemeral nature of scientific theories takes by surprise the man of the
world. Their brief period of prosperity ended, he sees them abandoned one
after another; he sees ruins piled upon ruins; he predicts that the theories in
fashion today will in a short time succumb in their turn, and he concludes that
they are absolutely in vain. This is what he calls the bankruptcy of science.
The structuralist exit is stated thus:
The true relations between these real objects are the only reality we can attain,
and the sole condition is that the same relations shall exist between these objects
as between the images we are forced to put in their place. If the relations are
known to us, what does it matter if we think it convenient to replace one image
by another? In the case of contradiction [between two theories] one of them at
least should be considered false. But this is no longer the case if we only seek
in them what should be sought. It is quite possible that they both express true
relations, and that the contradictions only exist in the images we have formed
to ourselves of reality. (SH, pp. 161, 163)
In other words, theories that contradict one another at the level of the images associated
with them may be found to agree once we restrict our attention to the relations expressed by
the theories. It is this observation (incorporated within Poincare´’s epistemic relationism—
cf. section 3) that Poincare´ puts to work in his rejection of the “bankruptcy of science”. By
focusing on the relations instead of troublesome entity-talk, one can tell a continuous (and
progressive) story about the history of scientific theories. Poincare´ stresses that while the
entities may change in the transition from one theory to the next, the form of the old theory
is preserved: “Our equations become, it is true, more and more complicated... but nothing
is changed in the relations which enable these equations to be derived from each other”
(SH, p. 181). A successful theory is not one that necessarily gets the entities right—indeed,
Poincare´ is dubious that the truth of such claims can be evaluated at all!—but instead, a
successful theory is one that correctly describes observed relations and fails to affirm false
ones. The very best theories are those throwing into relief the greatest number of known
relations and thereby exhibiting “traces of definitive construction” (SH, p. 175).
What is the relationship between the “bankruptcy of science” and Poincare´’s structural-
ism? The standard interpretation, stemming from Worrall, is that the pessimistic meta-
induction is a motivation for Poincare´’s structuralism. If this is correct, then Poincare´’s
position might similarly be understood as a retreat from scientific realism in the face of
the pessimistic meta-induction, and might justly be thought of as a historical forerunner
to Worrall’s epistemic structuralism.
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It seems to us, however, that the inference in Poincare´ is from his epistemic structural-
ism, independently grounded, to the rejection of the bankruptcy of science (rather than the
other way around, as in Worrall’s arguments). This claim is supported by the structure of
Poincare´’s argument, as set out in SH. In this text, Poincare´ is developing an epistemology
of science that begins with arithmetic and geometry and goes on to explain the role of
mathematical physics in the natural sciences. As we have discussed here, his central con-
cerns are the status of arithmetic and geometry, and of objective knowledge, as those issues
were understood at the turn of the century, and his solutions are rooted in his Kantian
epistemology. He is not primarily concerned with defending empirical science from anti-
realist arguments in the form of the pessimistic meta-induction. In fact, it seems instead
that after developing his position, Poincare´ then considers the bankruptcy of science to be
trivially answered by his very position, in the manner of a corollary. Poincare´’s discussion
of the “bankruptcy of science” and its rejection by appeal to epistemic structuralism occurs
in the tenth chapter (of thirteen) in SH, after Poincare´ has already introduced, motivated,
and elaborated his structuralist position. In short, we believe we have demonstrated above
that the pessimistic meta-induction plays a much smaller role in Poincare´’s overall consid-
erations than is commonly believed, and little if any in the fundamental motivations for
Poincare´’s epistemic structuralism (cf. sections 3 and 5 above). This is not to say that one
cannot use Poincare´’s ideas to construct Worrall’s argument for epistemic structuralism
(and even ESR)—surely one can. The point is simply that this is not how Poincare´ himself
went about arguing for his position.
8.2 The three arguments compared
On Worrall’s account, the grounds for epistemic modesty rest on an argument from history:
as a matter of historical fact (so the claim goes) it has turned out that science has seen
a series of ontological discontinuities concerning the natures of the entities posited within
theories. There is nothing in the argument for ESR that warrants the claim that the
development of science had to go this way, nor that it must continue to show such ontological
discontinuities. ESR is thus consistent with a future in which the ontology of our best
theories has been stable for such a long time that the pessimistic meta-induction loses its
force, and epistemic immodesty begins to regain its plausibility. In sum, the commitment
to ESR is contingent upon the history of science.
By contrast, neither the argument from objectivity nor the argument from generaliza-
tion is historically contingent. The former argument rests on a specific claim about the
nature of objective knowledge. The latter argument rests on Poincare´’s epistemology—
specifically, his account of a priori intuition and its role in grounding our ability to gener-
alize.
As we noted above, the conclusion of the argument from objectivity (“Objective knowl-
edge just is knowledge of relations”) extends beyond scientific theories to objects of knowl-
edge in general, including scientific facts. These too, according to Poincare´, are relational.
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The conclusion of this argument is therefore much stronger than is argued for by contem-
porary advocates of ESR.
Unlike the argument from objectivity, the argument from generalization is specific
to scientific theories. In addition, it is worth noting that one could endorse this latter
argument—and the conclusion that scientific theories are structures—without endorsing
Poincare´’s own view that the scientific facts are themselves relational. The conclusion of
the argument from generalization is that the generalizations constructed on the basis of
the scientific facts (whatever the nature of these facts may be) must be structural. One
might think that there are non-structural aspects to “the facts” (or at least to some of the
facts). One might also think that scientific theorizing could go astray if, when we generalize
over the facts, we inadvertently “boost” non-structural aspects associated with the facts
up into the theories. According to the argument from generalization, such “boosting” of
non-structural aspects is illegitimate. Why? Because our ability to generalize is grounded
in a priori intuition, and the generalizations that a priori intuition warrants are of a struc-
tural nature. The appearance in our generalizations of any non-structural features of the
fact must thereby be considered epistemically unwarranted.
9 Conclusions
We conclude with some comparisons between Poincare´’s position and the ESR championed
by Worrall. Worrall’s position can be encapsulated by the thesis that we have good reason
to believe that the entities in the world exemplify the structures posited by our best sci-
entific theories, but we should be non-committal about the non-structural natures of the
entities in question. Poincare´’s position can be understood as endorsing a stronger thesis
in three respects. His position includes the claim that all objective knowledge, including all
scientific knowledge, is necessarily knowledge of relations. Thus, (1) not just our scientific
theories, but also the facts from which they are derived should be understood structurally,
and (2) no “non-structural” objective knowledge is possible. This is part of the argument
from objectivity. Finally, theories are structures: our ability to construct them is grounded
in a priori intuition. Thus, (3) a structuralist approach to scientific theories does not follow
from a choice we make to be epistemically modest in the face of history, but from what is
epistemically warranted given our nature as knowers.
Our primary goal in this paper has been to clarify the ways in which Poincare´’s struc-
turalism differs from current ESR. We have seen that his epistemology is strongly influenced
by Kant, and that his realism must also be understood in this light. Furthermore, where
our theories contain principles they also contain an element of convention, and Poincare´
cashes out what is “real” in terms of what is inter-subjective; both of these features of
his philosophy bear on the “realist” characterization of his position. What one says about
these issues, along with the “stronger” aspects mentioned above, will affect whether one
interprets Poincare´ as offering a form of ESR or not. In any case, it is clear that his position
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differs in interesting ways from current versions of ESR.
In our discussion of Poincare´’s philosophy of science we have come across three argu-
ments for structuralism. The first of these—Worrall’s argument for ESR—is historically
contingent. The other two are principled rather than being contingent upon the history
of science. While current ESR is motivated primarily by the desire to overcome the pes-
simistic meta-induction, the latter two arguments may perhaps offer alternative ways to
think about structuralism within philosophy of science.
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